ΕΛΛΑΔΑ

Wikileaks: Εκτιμήσεις για εσωκομματικά ΠΑΣΟΚ

Στο τέλος Ιουνίου του 2008 ο Αμερικανός πρέσβης στην Αθήνα Ντάνιελ Σπέκχαρντ στέλνει στο State Department την δική του εκτίμηση για τις εσωκομματικές εξελίξεις στο ΠΑΣΟΚ και τα πιθανά οφέλη της κατάστασης για την ΝΔ.

Μεταξύ άλλων αναφέρεται στην επικράτηση Παπανδρέου έναντι του Ευάγγελου Βενιζέλου, η διαμάχη των οποίων άφησε πληγές στο κόμμα, αλλά και στην απομάκρυνση Σημίτη από την κοινοβουλευτική ομάδα του ΠΑΣΟΚ.

Ο αμερικανός πρέσβης τονίζει ότι η κατάσταση στην πολιτική σκηνή περιπλέκεται και από το αναδυόμενο τότε σκάνδαλο Siemens, για το οποίο λέει ότι μπορεί να αποδειχθεί πολύ μεγάλο.

Το τηλεγράφημα αναφέρει ότι η αποκάλυψη πως το δεξί χέρι του Σημίτη, ο Θεόδωρος Τσουκάτος, έλαβε από τη γερμανική εταιρία 420.000 ευρώ, έχει αναστατώσει ένα ήδη ταραγμένο ΠΑΣΟΚ.

Ο αμερικανός πρέσβης εκτιμά ότι παρά τα προβλήματα της Νέας Δημοκρατίας, που συν τοις άλλοις αντιμετωπίζει και την κοινωνική δυσαρέσκεια, από τότε που ανέλαβε ο Παπανδρέου το ΠΑΣΟΚ παραμένει πίσω σε όλες τις δημοσκοπήσεις και αυτό δε φαίνεται να αλλάζει.

Οι επικριτές του Παπανδρέου αναφέρουν ότι δεν έχει καταφέρει να ασκήσει αποτελεσματική αντιπολίτευση, ενώ προσπαθεί να αλλάξει το ΠΑΣΟΚ και να το κάνει κάτι που δεν είναι.

Από την πλευρά τους, οι υποστηρικτές του Παπανδρέου θεωρούν ότι η «εκκαθάριση» Σημίτη θα ενισχύσει τη θέση του προέδρου του ΠΑΣΟΚ.

Ο αμερικανός πρέσβης τέλος, αναφέρει ότι η παρατεταμένη δυσαρέσκεια στο κόμμα έχει οδηγήσει τον Παπανδρέου να υιοθετήσει μία πιο λαϊκή και πατριωτική γλώσσα που θυμίζει τον πατέρα του, αλλά και αντιαμερικανικά σλόγκαν. Επίσης, τίθεται κατά της ανεξαρτησίας του Κοσόβου και αλλάζει στάση για την ευρωπαϊκή πορεία της Τουρκίας, την οποία υποστήριξε όταν ήταν υπουργός Εξωτερικών μαζί με τον Σημίτη.

______________________________________________________

ΤΟ ΤΗΛΕΓΡΑΦΗΜΑ:

ID : 159440

08ATHENS899

RefID :

Date :

Origin :

24/6/2008 2:22:00 μμ

Classification :

Embassy Athens

CONFIDENTIAL

Header :

VZCZCXYZ0003

OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0899/01 1761422

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 241422Z JUN 08

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2053

INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000899

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2018

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, GR

SUBJECT: GREECE: AS SUMMER HEATS UP, PASOK MELTS DOWN

REF: ATHENS 835

Classified By: A/POLCOUNS JEFFREY HOVENIER. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite popular discontent with the New

Democracy (ND) government stemming from steep rises in food

and fuel costs, continued problems in the universities, and

hard-to-swallow pension reforms, leading opposition party

PASOK remains behind in the polls and has descended into an

internecine leadership struggle that seems destined only to

damage further the party´s standing. Seven months after

PASOK leader George Papandreou successfully fought off a

challenge from former minister Venizelos, the latest

leadership ruckus burst on the scene when former PASOK PM

Simitis publicly attacked Papandreou over the latter´s calls

for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (reftel). Papandreou

responded by expelling Simitis from the PASOK parliamentary

caucus — but not the party. The picture is further

1/5

caucus — but not the party. The picture is further

complicated by the unfolding scandal — which could turn out

to be major in scale — over alleged bribes by German

electronics firm Siemans of PASOK officials under then-PM

Simitis (and later to New Democracy politicians under current

PM Karamanlis). Party infighting and lingering discontent

have combined to push Papandreou away from his familiar

pro-Western attitude and more toward strident

“patriotic”-populist positions. This includes an

increasingly tough stance on the Macedonia nme issue, Kosovo

independence, and waning support for Turkey´s EU bid. END

SUMMARY.

—————————-

PASOK´S SUMMER OF DISCONTENT

—————————-

2. (SBU) In a letter delivered on June 12, PASOK leader

Papandreou informed former PM Costas Simitis that he would no

longer be considered a deputy of the PASOK parliamentary

caucus after criticizing publicly Papandreou´s call for a

popular referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (reftel; the treaty

was ratified by parliament on June 11 with the votes of both

the incumbent ND and PASOK). Papandreou stopped short of

expelling Simitis from the party, but he said the former PM

would stay outside the parliamentary caucus “for an

indefinite period of time.” Simitis responded by sending

another letter to Papandreou, reminding him that PASOK had

lost every election since he, Papandreou, became the leader

in January 2004 and declared he would not be silenced any

longer when it came to larger policy issues.

3. (C) On June 19, however, the situation took a new twist

when Simitis´s former right-hand man and top PASOK executive

Theodoros Tsoukatos publicly admitted he had received EUR

420,000 (one million old deutschmarks in 1998) as a

“political contribution” from German electronics giant

Siemens AG, money which later ended up in PASOK´s treasury.

With a widening special investigation into alleged Siemens

bribery of Greek politicians under way in Greece, Papandreou

rushed to announce that any PASOK party member implicated in

the Siemens affair would automatically lose his/her party

membership unless cleared by the courts. (NOTE: The Seimens

scandal is rapidly escalating and may consume both PASOK and

ND politicians. END NOTE.) The Tsoukatos revelations have

shaken an already strained PASOK badly and led many

commentators to wonder whether Simitis himself was aware of

these alleged illicit transactions.

4. (C) This latest crisis inside PASOK comes just seven

months after Papandreou successfully fought off a leadership

2/5

months after Papandreou successfully fought off a leadership

challenge launched by senior party member and former minister

Evangelos Venizelos. The leadership challenge badly divided

the party and left it with wounds that are still festering.

In a televised interview after Simitis´s ouster from the

Parliamentary group, Papandreou assumed a tough stance toward

in-party dissidence and warned that any further attempts by

individual members “to hoist their own flag” would lead to

summary expulsion. Press reports claimed the PASOK leader

was already preparing to expel other prominent Simitis

supporters, irrespective of their status and party history.

The atmosphere has worsened further due to the veteran

member, and Andreas Papandreou loyalist, Paraskevas Avgerinos

launching a petition to defend the former PM, a move that has

incensed many in the Papandreou camp.

————————————–

ND WOES DON´T TRANSLATE TO PASOK GAINS

————————————–

5. (SBU) Papandreou faces a tough predicament. Despite

widespread problems for the ND government of PM Karamanlis,

PASOK has been behind New Democracy in every major nationwide

poll since Papandreou took control of the party in 2004 and

the trend shows little evidence of changing. The

authoritative MRB Trends report for June 2008 placed New

Democracy again ahead of PASOK by almost three percentage

points and Karamanlis ahead of Papandreou in voter preference

for prime minister 34.1 to 24.9 percent.

6. (C) Papandreou critics stress the inability of PASOK to

mount an effective opposition at a time when the government

of PM Karamanlis faces growing voter anger and labor unrest

over skyrocketing fuel and food prices and media claims of

rampant profiteering; stubborn inflation above the EU average

and rising unemployment; highly unpopular pension and social

security reforms; a lingering, violent upheaval inside state

universities; and attempts to continue privatization of

commercial ports, the OTE telecommunications company, and the

DEI public power corporation.

7. (C) Critics also blame the PASOK leader for losing focus

and neglecting opposition politics because of his efforts to

change PASOK “into something that it is not.” Papandreou´s

personnel changes, his effective dismantling of all of the

“obsolete” PASOK party organs, his emphasis on organizational

plans emphasizing new technologies not well received by many

party organizers, and his seeming inability to find a party

platform that can attract voters in sufficient numbers and

return PASOK to power have alienated not only the “old

guard,” whose ranking members have all been sidelined, but

3/5

guard,” whose ranking members have all been sidelined, but

also many social groups traditionally voting for PASOK and

now seeking refuge in smaller opposition parties.

—————–

QUO VADIS, PASOK?

—————–

8. (C) While pollsters generally agree that Simitis´s name is

unpopular among voters across party lines, the unprecedented

ejection of a former PM from the PASOK caucus has triggered

reflex reactions from all those who oppose the Papandreou

leadership. Venizelos, who remains the primary leadership

aspirant, has resisted calls for a public statement

supporting Simitis and has observed party discipline. Yet,

he is reportedly “seeking advice” from his more trusted

interlocutors inside the party and biding his time hoping

that he will soon be catapulted by developments to “save”

PASOK from collapse. Others, however, have already spoken

out publicly, leading many commentators to describe the

situation as “ominous” for party unity.

9. (C) Papandreou´s supporters believe purging Simitis will

ultimately enhance the position of the PASOK president. For

now, however, this appears to be the minority opinion. Polls

conducted since Simitis´s dvery ten

PASOK voter´eou´s initiative and tts highlighting the riQision”

of the socialist Meltdown

are thus growin´en whether Papandreou´s@iscipline would be capQ

the tide and offering the socialists a credible chance

against New Democracy.

——————————-

IMPACT ON U.S. POLICY INTERESTS

——————————-

10. (C) Party infighting and lingering discontent have

combined to push Papandreou away from his familiar

pro-Western attitude and more toward an often strident,

“patriotic”-populist language reminiscent of his late father.

In the battle to retain and/or attract traditional PASOK

voters and to shield his leadership from accusations of

“selling out to the Americans,” Papandreou has recently

resorted to uncharacteristically anti-American slogans and

blanket criticism of American policies. Papandreou´s return

to these older PASOK propaganda motifs have been exploited by

the Karamanlis government but, ironically, may have also

given the PM less space to handle issues such as the name

dispute with the Republic of Macedonia (“YROM”).

Papandreou´s PASOK has also adopted anegative stance on

Kosovo independence and is radually shifting away from

4/5

Kosovo independence and is radually shifting away from

supporting Turkey´s EU accession. Indeed, it was Simitis

himself — (along with then-FM Papandreou) the main architect

of Greece´s step-by-step rapprochement with Turkey during the

late 1990s — who recently announced that Turkey should not

become a full EU member but, rather, seek a “special

relationship” with the European club.

SPECKHARD

;2008-06-24 14:22

PGOV, PREL, GR

Tags :

5/5

skai

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