WikiLeaks – Δεκεμβριανά 2008: Απών ο Καραμανλής

Oι εκτιμήσεις των ΗΠΑ για τα γεγονότα του Δεκέμβρη του 2008:

Η αμερικανική οπτική γωνία σε ό,τι αφορά τα δραματικά γεγονότα του 2008 παρουσιάζεται μέσα από τις διαρροές των τηλεγραφημάτων της πρεσβείας των ΗΠΑ στην Αθήνα από τον ιστότοπο WikiLeaks
Στις 18 Δεκεμβρίου του 2008 ο αμερικανός πρέσβης στην Αθήνα αποστέλλει στο State Department τηλεγράφημα στο οποίο επιχειρείται μία εξήγηση των κοινωνικών και άλλων αιτίων που οδήγησαν στις ταραχές στην Αθήνα μετά τη δολοφονία του Αλέξανδρου Γρηγορόπουλου, παρουσιάζεται η στάση της κυβέρνησης Καραμανλή και οι προβλέψεις για το πολιτικό της μέλλον, αλλά αναφέρεται και πώς θίγονται από τα γεγονότα τα αμερικανικά συμφέροντα στην Αθήνα.

Ο Ντάνιελ Σπέκχαρντ επικρίνει τον τότε πρωθυπουργό για τη στάση του στα Δεκεμβριανά, κάνοντας λόγο για “απουσία Καραμανλή”, ενώ αναφερόμενος στα αίτια των ταραχών επιτίθεται στα ελληνικά ΜΜΕ υποστηρίζοντας ότι κάλυψαν τα γεγονότα της δολοφονίας Γρηγορόπουλου “ανεύθυνα και εμπρηστικά”. Ακόμη, αποκαλεί ΚΚΕ και ΣΥΡΙΖΑ “δεινοσαύρους”.

ΣΗΜΕΙΩΣΗ: Ορισμένοι χαρακτήρες του τηλεγραφήματος εμφανίζονται μη κανονικά, λόγω προβλήματος που υπάρχει στην βάση δεδομένων.

“Σοκ στην Ελλάδα από το θάνατο του Γρηγορόπουλου”
Οι ταραχές που άρχισαν στην Ελλάδα μετά τον πυροβολισμό ενός εφήβου στις 6 Δεκεμβρίου προκάλεσαν σοκ και στους πιο κυνικούς Έλληνας, και είχαν ως αποτέλεσμα οικονομικές ζημιές ύψους εκατοντάδων εκατομμυρίων ευρώ.

Ο αναβρασμός που επικρατεί έχει προκαλέσει βαθιά πόλωση στην κοινωνία, με τη νεολαία, ανεξαρτήτως κοινωνικοί-οικονομικού προφίλ, να υποστηρίζει σε μεγάλο βαθμό τις διαδηλώσεις, και το μεγαλύτερο μέρος του κόσμου άνω των 30 ετών να καταδικάζει τη βία.

Αν και είναι δύσκολο να αποσαφηνίσουμε τα ακριβή αίτια των ταραχών, παράγοντες που συντελούν σε μεγάλο βαθμό στα τεκταινόμενα είναι οι εξής:

– Η αποπνικτική κατάσταση που προκάλεσαν μερικές εκατοντάδες υπέρ-ριζοσπαστικοποιημένων “αναρχικών”
– Η δυσαρέσκεια της κοινής γνώμης με τη διαφθορά και με τους πολιτικούς ηγέτες
– Η απογοήτευση της νεολαίας, που βλέπει ότι έχει λιγότερες οικονομικές ευκαιρίες σε σύγκριση με τις προηγούμενες γενιές
– Η ανεύθυνη και εμπρηστική κάλυψη των γεγονότων από τα ΜΜΕ, που βάπτισαν τον πυροβολισμό (σ.σ: του Αλέξανδρου Γρηγορόπουλου) δολοφονία εν ψυχρώ
– Οι δυνάμεις ασφαλείας εμφανίζουν χαμηλό ηθικό, έχουν εξασθενίσει από περιορισμούς που τους επιβλήθηκαν μετά τη Χούντα, και δεν απολαύουν της λαϊκής εμπιστοσύνης
– Η λαϊκή συμπάθεια (και σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις νοσταλγία) για τη ριζοσπαστική Αριστερά και για τις εκδηλώσεις αντίθεσης με βίαια μέσα

“Απών ο Καραμανλής”
Η αντίδραση της κυβέρνησης χαρακτηρίζεται από την απουσία του Καραμανλή, και οι περισσότερες κυβερνητικές ανακοινώσεις αφέθηκαν στον υπουργό Εσωτερικών Παυλόπουλο.

Προφανώς η κυβέρνηση έδωσε εντολή στην αστυνομία να αντιδράσει τηρώντας αποκλειστικά αμυντική στάση. Πιστεύουμε ότι ο πρωθυπουργός ήθελε να αποφύγει νέους θανάτους, ή να μη δώσει λαβή για νέες διαμαρτυρίες και διαπραγματεύσεις με τις αρχές (όπως στην περίπτωση κατάληψης κυβερνητικού κτιρίου).

Πολλοί Έλληνες πιστεύουν ότι ο Καραμανλής δεν χειρίστηκε καλά την κατάσταση – τόσο με το να μην λάβει σκληρότερη στάση όσο και με το να επιτρέψει την επιδείνωση των κοινωνικό-οικονομικών συνθηκών (…)

“Θα επηρεαστούν τα αμερικανικά συμφέροντα”
Τα αμερικανικά συμφέροντα θα επηρρεαστούν. Περιοριζόμενη από την αναταραχή, θα είναι πιο εσωστρεφής από το συνηθισμένο. Είναι πολύ πιθανό η Ελλάδα να μην έχει τη θέληση ή τη δυνατότητα να αναλάβει τολμηρές πρωτοβουλίες στην περιφερειακή εξωτερική της πολιτική, όπως το όνομα της Μακεδονίας, τις σχέσεις με την Τουρκία, ή την άσκηση πιέσεων στους Ελληνοκυπρίους για το Κυπριακό. Η κυβερνητική γραφειοκρατία, ανέκαθεν προσεκτική, θα είναι ακόμη πιο επιφυλακτική μπροστά στην πολιτική αβεβαιότητα, κάνοντας δύσκολη την αντιμετώπιση άλλων ζητημάτων στην ατζέντα μας (…)

Τέλος, υπάρχει ιστορικό προηγούμενο με ελληνικές τρομοκρατικές οργανώσεις που προχωρούν σε χτυπήματα εν μέσω κοινωνικής αναστάτωσης, εκμεταλλευόμενες τις εξασθενημένες και με χαμηλό ηθικό δυνάμεις ασφαλείας. Θα χρειαστεί να συνεχίσουμε να παρακολουθούμε στενά μια πιθανή αυξημένη τρομοκρατική απειλή.

ΤΟ ΤΗΛΕΓΡΑΦΗΜΑ:

ID : 183694

08ATHENS1692

RefID :

Date :

Origin :

18/12/2008 1:00:00 μμ

Classification :

Embassy Athens

SECRET

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OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV

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FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2941

INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 001692

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018

TAGS: PREL, SOCI, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, TU, MK, GR

SUBJECT: GREEK RIOTS – WHAT HAPPENED AND HOW THEY IMPACT

U.S. INTERESTS

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d)

——-

SUMMARY

——-

1. (C) The riots that began in Greece following the December

6 police shooting of a teenager have shocked even the most

cynical of Greeks, and have resulted in hundreds of millions

of Euros in economic damage. The unrest has deeply polarized

society, with youth of all socio-economic backgrounds

generally supporting the demonstrations, and most people over

thirty condemning the violence. Although it is difficult to

pinpoint the exact causes of the riots, major contributing

factors included:

— the insular, hothouse atmosphere of Greece´s few hundred

ultra-radical “anarchists;”

1/7

ultra-radical “anarchists;”

— popular frustration with corruption and political leaders;

— the disillusionment of the youth, who see fewer economic

opportunities than previous generations did;

— irresponsible and inflammatory media coverage branding the

shooting as cold-blooded murder;

— demoralized Greek security forces, weakened by post-junta

limits and public distrust; and

— popular sympathy (and in some cases nostalgia) for the

radical left and public tolerance of expressions of

opposition through violent means.

2. (C) The government response was characterized by PM

Karamanlis´ absence, and most government announcements were

left to Minister of Interior Pavlopoulos. The government

apparently instructed the police to respond solely with a

defensive posture. We believe the Prime Minister wanted to

avoid any additional deaths or any platform for grievances

and negotiations with the authorities (such as an occupied

government building). Many Greeks believe the Karamanlis

government mishandled the situation — both by not taking a

tougher stance against the violence but also by having

allowed socioeconomic conditions to deteriorate. Thus, most

Greeks, including those who would normally be Karamanlis

supporters, now believe it is only a matter of time before

the PM has to call new elections, although Karamanlis appears

resolutely opposed to doing so. We expect the opposition to

continue to press hard to bring down the government, and we

expect the government to take steps to show leadership and

action, including likely Cabinet changes.

3. (S) U.S. interests will be affected. Constrained by the

unrest, the Greek government will be even more

inwardly-focused than usual. Greece will likely be unwilling

or unable to take bold actions on regional foreign policy

issues, including the Macedonia name issue, relations with

Turkey, or pressing the Greek Cypriots on negotiations in

Cyprus. The government bureaucracy, ever cautious, will

become even more wary in the face of political uncertainty,

making it harder to address other issues on our agenda,

including commercial, educational, security, and human rights

issues. Finally, there are precedents in Greece for domestic

terrorist groups to strike in the wake of major civil unrest,

taking advantage of exhausted and demoralized security

forces. We will need to continue to monitor aggressively a

potentially growing domestic terrorist threat. End Summary.

—————

What Caused It?

—————

2/7

4. (C) Although Greece is no stranger to demonstrations that

include destruction of property, Molotov cocktails, and

rioting, the riots that began on December 6 were

qualitatively different. Estimates are still pending, but

the total bill is expected to amount to hundreds of millions

of Euros in damage. The rioting and demonstrations were not

limited to Athens and Thessaloniki but took place throughout

the country, including in normally quiet provincial centers.

Also, although the violent demonstrations were initially the

work of anarchists, thousands of university and high school

students of both sexes eventually joined in. Televised

footage showed youths as young as 13 throwing rocks at police.

5. (C) Reports by major foreign news organizations

highlighted problems in the Greek economy as a cause of the

rioting, and these problems certainly played a role. Like

other smaller European economies, Greece is being affected by

the global downturn. Its two leading industries -) shipping

and tourism -) already are feeling the impact of the credit

ATHENS 00001692 002 OF 004

contraction and weakening consumer demand. GDP growth,

relatively strong in recent years (4 percent in 2007), has

slowed in 2008 (the government projection is for 3.2

percent), and is expected to decelerate further in 2009 (the

government projection is for 2.7 percent, but private

analysts, including the IMF, project a lower 2.0 percent

growth rate). Unemployment, especially amongst the young, is

rising, and about a fifth of the population now lives below

the official poverty line. Unemployment numbers are likely

to spike as the economic slowdown hits Greece´s real economy

in the new year. But even before the current global

downturn, the Greek economy suffered from structural problems

including a rigid labor market and a large public share of

the economy that limited its flexibility, discouraged

innovation, and stymied expansion. Greece, indeed, has many

of the elements of a corporatist system, in which a

relatively small group of well-known families control

economic and political centers of power. Corruption and

connections, rather than entrepreneurship and innovation, are

seen as the keys to getting ahead. Greece is considered an

unattractive place to work and invest, ranking 96th -) the

lowest in the EU -) in the World Bank´s “doing business”

ranking.

6. (C) The Karamanlis government came to power in 2004 with

a reformist agenda, but has met with resistance from

entrenched interests and members of the public — all for

reform as long as it does not reduce their own individual

3/7

reform as long as it does not reduce their own individual

perks. Moreover, the Karamanlis government has been plagued

by its own corruption scandals, including the current

Vatopedion monastery affair, which brought down some of the

Prime Minister´s closest advisors.

7. (C) Problems in the economy and governance have led to

widespread social dissatisfaction and a sense that economic

opportunities, for the first time in a generation, are

contracting. These frustrations contributed to the recent

rioting and fostered an attitude of tolerance amongst much of

the general public for the youthful “victims” of a government

and society unresponsive to their needs. At the same time,

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“asylum” policies prohibit state security forces from

entering campuses without permission from university

administrators (granted very rarely), adding to the

ideologically charged atmosphere of “anything goes.”

9. (C) The anarchists, headquartered at the Athens

Polytechnic, have escalated their violence in recent years.

Many observers believe that this trend was a concerted

attempt to provoke the police into a disproportionate

response, in turn sparking an even broader “uprising.” The

anarchists appeared to get what they wanted in the December 6

ATHENS 00001692 003 OF 004

shooting of Grigoropoulos, and they used blogs and SMSes to

spread the news and mobilize their forces. As anarchist

violence escalated, other university and eventually high

school and even middle school students, some disgruntled,

others attracted by the radical chic, joined in.

————————–

Dinosaurs of the Hard Left

————————–

10. (C) Exacerbating the unrest was the opportunism of the

leftist political parties. Unlike their counterparts in many

other European countries, the leftist parties of Greece have

not evolved with the fall of the Berlin Wall, further EU

integration, and economic globalization. The ideology,

tactics, and goals of the Greek “hard left” remain much as

they were during the Cold War, and these parties have served

4/7

they were during the Cold War, and these parties have served

as a retiring ground for many aging anarchists. Reflecting

the ideological divisions of an earlier era, the left remains

divided between the orthodox Marxist-Leninist, Soviet-style

Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the new left SYRIZA

party, which has taken up the slogans and mindset of

anti-globalization while retaining a loyalty to Marxism.

Both the KKE and SYRIZA supported the recent demonstrations

in an effort to further discredit the government. While the

KKE publicly supported only peaceful, disciplined

demonstrations, however, SYRIZA more openly egged anarchists

and students on to violent action.

——————-

Irresponsible Press

——————-

11. (C) Finally, the Greek press had a role in aggravating

the riots. Most Greek media carried breathless reports

seemingly aimed at inflaming and not calming the situation.

Media hyperbole helped trample the principle of “innocent

until proven guilty” in the court of public opinion, with

many journalists reporting that the accused police officer

had fired on Grigoropoulos in cold blood, although government

officials made similar statements. Police explanations that

the shooting may have been accidental were derisively

dismissed.

————————————

What Did the Government Do About It?

————————————

12. (C) One of the most striking aspects of the events was

the Prime Minister´s absence; Karamanlis stayed largely out

of the public eye, leaving public statements to his Minister

of Interior, Prokopis Pavlopoulos. At the height of the

violence, Karamanlis made just two short television

appearances — calling for calm in the one and laying out a

technocratic, detailed plan for government assistance to

affected businesses in the other.

13. (C) The police generally did not respond assertively to

the violence and instead assumed a defensive posture. We

assess that there are two explanations:

— Initial Indecision: Initially taken by surprise, the

government took the populist road, not wanting to be seen as

“fascists,” and thus did not direct the police to clamp down.

5/7

— Avoid Any Additional Deaths and Deny Anarchists a

Platform: As the riots worsened, however, we assess that

Karamanlis and his advisors calculated that he must first and

foremost avoid the possibility of any additional deaths that

could fuel greater unrest. At the same time, greater force

was apparently authorized to allow police to ensure that the

protestors did not occupy government buildings or significant

landmarks that could be used as a basis for a prolonged

public platform for grievances and negotiations with the

authorities. The police were clearly operating under

different rules of engagement when defending the Parliament

or the Foreign Ministry, than the commercial establishments

next door.

——————

What Does It Mean?

——————

14. (C) Weaker Government: While the long-term implications

for Karamanlis are unclear, for now many Greeks believe the

PM and his government severely mishandled the situation.

ATHENS 00001692 004 OF 004

Most, including those who would normally be Karamanlis

supporters, are openly stating that it is only a matter of

time before the PM has to call new elections. Conventional

wisdom holds that these events are a final “mortal blow” that

comes on the heels of other political crises, scandals, and

the global economic crisis. The opposition, criticizing the

government´s response, called for the government to step

down, and we expect these calls to grow louder, particularly

if the unrest continues. The opposition is smelling blood.

That said, it is impossible to predict exactly when this shoe

might drop. If/when the government does fall will depend

less on the opposition and more on dissent within the

government´s own ranks. We expect the government to take

steps to show leadership and action, including likely Cabinet

changes.

15. (C) Our Interests: In short, the Karamanlis government

will be even more inward-looking than before, and it will be

either unwilling or unable to take bold actions or be out of

sync with popular sentiments on key regional foreign policy

issues. This means that the Greek government will likely

take defensive positions on the Macedonia name issue and

relations with Turkey. It will also likely eschew any troop

deployments that could open it up to criticism — such as

sending significantly increased numbers to Afghanistan.

Greek politicians will also be unwilling to be out of sync

6/7

Greek politicians will also be unwilling to be out of sync

with the Greek Cypriot leadership, and therefore loathe to

press them on any aspect of the current negotiations. The

ever-cautious Greek bureaucracy will, in the face of

political uncertainty, become even more risk adverse, making

it harder to address other issues on our agenda, such as

commercial, educational, security, and human rights issues.

Finally, should rumors of a cabinet reshuffle or early

elections grow stronger, FM Bakoyannis may be seen by her

interlocutors as a potential “lame duck” as she takes on the

role of OSCE Chairman-in-Office in January.

16. (S) Terrorism: Most importantly, we will need to

monitor aggressively the growing domestic terrorist threat.

Following the public outrage that resulted from the 1985

killing of a youth by police, the November 17 terrorist group

entered a renewed operational phase and carried out

additional attacks against Greek, U.S., and other targets.

We will need to sharpen our vigilance to defend ourselves and

to encourage a robust Greek response to terrorism in the face

of exhausted and demoralized security services, popular

dissatisfaction and angst, and a government that will

undoubtedly have its attention focused elsewhere.

SPECKHARD

;2008-12-18 13:00

PREL, SOCI, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, TU, MK, GR

Tags : 7/7

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